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WISCONSIN'S BORROWING STATUTE: DID WE
SHORTCHANGE OURSELVES?
I. INTRODUCTION
Two Wisconsin residents embark on a vacation by car. On
January 7, 1985, they are involved in an automobile accident.
On January 2, 1986, the plaintiff passenger calls you for ad-
vice and wants to bring suit against the defendant driver for
injuries. In full awareness of Wisconsin's three-year statute of
limitation for personal injury suits,1 you conclude that there is
plenty of time to file a complaint and you set up an appoint-
ment for the following week to get the particular facts.
At next week's meeting the passenger informs you that the
accident occurred while driving through Alabama. A quick
check of Alabama law tells you that you have missed the stat-
ute of limitation by several days, as Alabama law at the time
only allowed one year for some types of personal injuries.2
In a second scenario, the Wisconsin client is a victim of
asbestosis caused by exposure to asbestos fibers. A product
liability suit is contemplated. The judicially implied discovery
rule in product liability suits4 will allow commencement
within three years from the date at which the injury was or
could have been reasonably diagnosed. 5 As the disease was
diagnosed on October 1, 1984, the statute of limitation should
not present a problem until October of 1987.
The defendant's expert produces unrefuted testimony that
the disease was reasonably diagnosable on September 1, 1984,
at which time the plaintiff was in the middle of a two-month
vacation in New York. The last element of the cause of action
to occur is this discovery; therefore, the cause of action arose
while the plaintiff was in New York.6 Although the plaintiff is
1. Wls. STAT. § 893.54 (1983-84).
2. ALA. CODE § 6-2-39 (1975) (repealed Jan. 9, 1985). Section 6-2-38 (1985) grants
two years.
3. Asbestos litigation has become extremely common. Even as early as 1981, there
were approximately 25,000 suits pending. Note, Asbestos Litigation, 10 OKLA. CITY
U.L. REV. 393, 397 (1985).
4. Hansen v. A.H. Robins Co., 113 Wis. 2d 550, 560, 335 N.W.2d 578, 583 (1983).
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., Renfroe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 541 F. Supp. 805, 807 (E.D. Mo.), aff'd, 686
F.2d 642 (8th Cir. 1982).
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entitled to bring suit against the fiber manufacturer in a Wis-
consin court (assuming personal jurisdiction over the defend-
ant), will the court have to apply the New York statute of
limitation and its provision that the clock begins ticking from
the time of initial exposure to the fibers, 7 thus barring recov-
ery to the Wisconsin plaintiff? Should this be affected by the
residency of the plaintiff? Of the defendant?
These are only a few of the problems which arise under
Wisconsin's borrowing statute." Section 893.07(1) of the Wis-
consin Statutes states, "[i]f an action is brought in this state on
a foreign cause of action and the foreign period of limitation
which applies has expired, no action may be maintained in
this state." 9 Although Section 893.07(1) applies to any type of
foreign action, this Comment will focus on actions based on
tort law as they generally have a shorter statute of limitation0
and are thus of more practical concern.
Part II will provide a brief overview of the history and
purpose of borrowing statutes, as well as delineate the differ-
ent types of statutes in use in various jurisdictions. 1I Part III
focuses on Wisconsin's borrowing statute and the effect it has
on certain actions in this state, an effect which this author crit-
icizes.12 Parts IV and V present alternative wordings of the
statute and attempt to dispel any constitutional problems
7. See Segala & Galbo, Asbestos: New York's Approach to the Statute of Limitations,
57 N.Y. ST. B.J., Nov. 1985, at 28, 29 (discusses the "archaic" approach of New York
with regard to measuring time from the last date of exposure to asbestos fibers).
8. Wis. STAT. § 893.07(1) (1983-84).
9. Id. Subsection (2) provides: "If an action is brought in this state on a foreign
cause of action and the foreign period of limitation which applies to that action has not
expired, but the applicable Wisconsin period of limitation has expired, no action may be
maintained in this state." Wis. STAT. § 893.07(2) (1983-84). This subsection insures
that the shorter period of limitation will be used in determining whether the action may
be brought in Wisconsin. Several other jurisdictions have neglected to make similar
legislative clarifications. In those cases, the judiciary has generally interpreted the bor-
rowing statute in a manner consistent with Wisconsin's approach. See, eg., Conner v.
Spencer, 304 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1962) (applying Oregon's borrowing statute); Keaton v.
Crayton, 326 F. Supp. 1155 (D.C. Mo. 1971); Murray v. Farrell, 2 Alaska 360 (1905);
Smith v. Elliard, 110 Mich. App. 25, 312 N.W.2d 161 (1981).
10. Compare Wis. STAT. § 893.43 (1983-84) (six years for contract action) with
Wis. STAT. § 893.54 (1983-84) (three years for personal injury); compare ILL ANN.
STAT. ch. 83, para. 17 (Smith-Hurd 1966) (ten years for written contract action) with
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, para. 15 (Smith-Hurd 1966) (two years for personal injury).
11. See infra notes 15-46 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 47-66 and accompanying text.
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which might arise.13 Finally, Part VI proposes two methods
of attaining these changes and the benefits of each proposed
change. 14
II. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF BORROWING STATUTES
A. Effect of Borrowing Statutes
Borrowing statutes, also called "anti-forum shopping"
statutes, 15 generally operate to bar any cause of action if the
jurisdiction in which the cause of action arose would bar the
action due to that jurisdiction's statute of limitation. 16 It is
essentially a legislative choice-of-law determination which re-
quires that the law of the place of injury (lex loci) be used to
ascertain the applicable statute of limitation rather than the
law of the forum (lex fori).17
The traditional distinctions of lex loci and lex fori were
based on the concept of procedural versus substantive law.
18
If classified as substantive, the law of the place of injury gener-
ally applied; if procedural, the law of the forum was used.19
For the purpose of choice-of-law determinations, statutes of
limitation have historically been classified as procedural mat-
ters and thus are governed by the law of the forum. 0
Borrowing statutes reverse the common law lex fori/lex
loci distinctions by applying the statute of limitation of the
place of injury.2" The statutes are legislatively mandated
choice-of-law rules which can involve a variety of factors,
among which is the residence of the parties involved in the
litigation.22 Although most states have fashioned their bor-
13. See infra notes 67-101 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 102-109 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Coen v. Ambrose-Augusterfer Corp., 463 A.2d 265, 267-68 (Del.
Super. 1983).
16. See, e.g., Office Supply Co. v. Basic/Four Corp., 538 F. Supp. 776, 781 (E.D.
Wis. 1982) (quoting from the Judicial Council Committee's Note, reprinted in Wis.
STAT. at § 893.07 (1983-84)).
17. See Miller v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 99 Idaho 299, -, 581 P.2d 345, 349 (1978).
18. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 comment b
(1971).
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., Vernon, Statutes of Limitation in the Conflict of Laws: Borrowing Stat-
utes, 32 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 287, 288 n.6 (1960).
21. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
22. Miller v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 99 Idaho 299, _, 581 P.2d 345, 349 (1978).
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rowing statutes to take this factor into consideration,2 3 Wis-
consin's statute is silent on this point.24
B. Purpose of Borrowing Statutes
As the name "anti-forum shopping" suggests, the primary
purpose of borrowing statutes is to prevent plaintiffs from
shopping for a forum which has a more lenient statute of limi-
tation.2 5 Because of the traditional lex fori and lex loci dis-
tinction,26 the forum's statute of limitation was often
automatically applied,27 and many plaintiffs seized upon the
opportunity to bring claims in jurisdictions where a favorable
disposition could be achieved despite their apparent tardiness
in bringing the claim.28
This "forum shopping" has been looked upon with disfa-
vor by courts2 9 and legislatures30 alike. The United States
Supreme Court has also expressed some concern at the routine
23. The following states have either a requirement or exception based on residency:
ALA. CODE § 6-2-17 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.220 (1983); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12-506 (1982); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 361 (West 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
10, § 8121 (1974); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 657-9 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 5-239 (1979);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, para. 21 (Smith-Hurd 1966) (residency requirement stems from
judicial interpretation of statute); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-2-6(b) (Bums 1986); IOVA
CODE ANN. § 614.7 (West 1950); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-516 (1983); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14, § 866 (1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 260, § 9 (West 1959); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5861 (West 1986); Miss. CODE ANN. § 15-1-65 (1972);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-104 (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-215 (1985); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 11.020 (Michie 1986); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 202 (McKinney 1972);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-21 (1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 12.260 (1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-
1-18 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-1-112 (1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-45
(1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.290 (1962).
24. Wisconsin's borrowing statute only considers whether the action is a "foreign
cause of action" and when the period of limitation expires. Wis. STAT. § 893.07(1)
(1983-84). See also infra notes 47-57 and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., Ester, Borrowing Statutes of Limitation and Conflict of Laws, 15 U.
FLA. L. REV. 33, 40 (1962); Case Note, Conflict of Laws - An Interest Analysis Ap-
proach to Wyoming's Borrowing Statute, 15 LAND & WATER L. REV. 717, 720 (1980).
26. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
27. R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICT OF LAWS § 127, at 305 (rev. ed. 1968).
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973) (New
Jersey court applied the New Hampshire statute of limitation despite the lack of a bor-
rowing statute).
30. See, e.g., Case Comment, Ouellette v. Sturm, Ruger & Co. and Jones v. North
American Aerodynamics: The Effectiveness of Maine's Borrowing Statute in Cases In-
volving Corporations, 37 ME. L. REV. 210, 213 (1985) (enactment of borrowing statute
clearly a response to forum shopping).
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application of a forum's statute of limitation to a cause of ac-
tion regardless of contacts between the forum and the litiga-
tion.31 The Court has not yet found it appropriate to
determine if such an application may be a violation of due
process.32
Problems associated with the application of a forum's stat-
ute of limitation have been rendered moot in many of the
cases which have arisen in the thirty-five jurisdictions cur-
rently utilizing borrowing statutes. 33 "Forum shopping" for
the purpose of attaining lengthier statutes of limitation has
been effectively curtailed as a result of the passage of this legis-
lation. Naturally, other provisions in a forum's law can be the
focus of such "shopping," but traditional choice-of-law con-
cerns often prevent a plaintiff from taking advantage of the
forum's laws if the provisions sought are substantive in nature.
There are other purposes behind statutes of limitation that
are applicable here. Statutes of limitation seek to achieve a
balance between the plaintiff's right to a reasonable time for
seeking recovery and the defendant's right to repose within a
reasonable time after the event giving rise to the cause of ac-
tion.34 If the time is unjustifiably short, the plaintiff is
31. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 778 n.10 (1984).
32. Id.
33. ALA. CODE § 6-2-17 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.220 (1983); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 12-506 (1982); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 361 (West 1982); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 8121 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.10 (West 1982); HAWAII REV.
STAT. § 657-9 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 5-239 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, para. 21
(Smith-Hurd 1966) (residency requirement stems from judicial interpretation of stat-
ute); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-2-6(b) (Burns 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 614.7 (West
1950); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-516 (1983); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.320 (Baldwin
1985); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 10 (West 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 866
(1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 260, § 9 (West 1959); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 600.5861 (West 1986); Miss. CODE ANN. § 15-1-65 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 516.190 (Vernon 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-104 (1985); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 25-215 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11.020 (Michie 1986); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. &
R. 202 (McKinney 1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-21 (1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§§ 104-108 (West 1985-86); OR. REV. STAT. § 12.260 (1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42,
§ 5521 (Purdon 1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-18 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-1-112
(1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-45 (1977); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-247 (1984);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.290 (1962); W. VA. CODE § 55-2-17 (1981); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 893.07 (West 1983); Wyo. STAT. § 1-3-117 (1977).
34. See Vernon, supra note 20. See generally Milhollin, Interest Analysis and Con-
flicts Between Statutes of Limitation, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1975).
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prejudiced in seeking a remedy. If it is unjustifiably long, the
defendant is prejudiced in remaining accountable.
Naturally, the courts have an interest in statutes of limita-
tion as well. By imposing statutory time limits, the court will
not be required to adjudicate stale claims or claims in which
evidence and witnesses are no longer available.3 5 This allows
the court to handle more recent claims and keep the ever-
growing caseload at a workable level.
Although borrowing statutes have an effect on the defend-
ant's interest in repose and the court's interest in adjudicating
claims quickly, this effect is certainly not an intended purpose
of the statutes. 36 The legislature has determined that certain
claims should be left for another state's statutory determina-
tion as to what laws are necessary to achieve the various pur-
poses behind statutes of limitation. Any "loss" resulting from
the decision to follow another state's statute is thought to be
offset by the "gain" in preventing forum shopping.
C. Types of Borrowing Statutes
There are perhaps as many types of borrowing statutes as
there are jurisdictions which have adopted them. It has been
said that the borrowing statutes are "so diverse that they have
produced a great deal of confusion. '37 Classifications by vari-
ous commentators have been almost as diverse.3 8 Rather than
a broad-based analysis of all the various groupings, the follow-
ing classification will deal only with the focus of this Com-
ment, the residency requirements.
Three of the thirty-five borrowing statutes are eliminated
from further consideration since they deal only with contract
actions or actions to enforce judgments. 39 Of the thirty-two
which remain, seven have no residency requirements: Florida,
35. See Vernon, supra note 20, at 297.
36. But see Case Note, supra note 25, at 721 (author suggests that borrowing stat-
utes serve to mitigate negative effect of tolling provisions on defendant).
37. R. LEFLAR, supra note 27, at § 128.
38. See, e.g., Ester, supra note 25, app. at 79-84 (categorized by a wide variety of
factors); Vernon, supra note 20, at 294-96 (categorized by statutory language used);
Note, Statutes of Limitation: Lex Loci or Lex Fori, 47 VA. L. REv. 299, 308-09 (1961)
(categorized by requirements).
39. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 10 (West 1986) (contract or judgment actions); VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-247 (1984) (contract actions); W. VA. CODE § 55-2-17 (1981) (con-
tract actions).
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Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and
Wyoming."
Residency requirements are of two types: (A) either a par-
ticular residency requirement must be met for the borrowing
statute to apply, or (B) the residency requirement must be met
for the exception to the borrowing statute to apply. Given a
situation involving a foreign statute of limitation which has
run and a forum statute which has not run, applying the first
type of residency requirement will result in the action being
barred. If the same situation were to be resolved under the
second type of residency requirement, it would result in the
exception applying and the action being governed by the fo-
rum statute of limitation.
Those states which have residency requirements for the
borrowing statute to apply are of three subtypes: (Al) the
plaintiff must have been a resident of the foreign state when
the cause of action accrued, (A2) the defendant must have
been a resident of the foreign state, or (A3) both plaintiff and
defendant were non-residents when the cause of action arose.
Included in Subtype Al are Arizona, Massachusetts and
Rhode Island.4 1 Subtype A2 includes Alabama, Indiana,
Iowa, Mississippi and Tennessee.42 Subtype A3 includes
Alaska, Illinois, Maine, Oregon and Washington.43
The residency requirements for the exception to apply are
of two subtypes: (B 1) the plaintiff must be a citizen or resident
of the forum state, or (B2) the defendant must be a resident of
the forum state. Subtype B1 is the largest with eleven states:
California, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Michigan,
40. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.10 (West 1982); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.320 (Bald-
win 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 516.190 (Vernon 1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§§ 104-108 (West 1985-86); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 5521 (Purdon 1981); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 893.07 (West 1983); Wyo. STAT. § 1-3-117 (1977).
41. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-506 (1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 260 § 9
(West 1959); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-18 (1985).
42. ALA. CODE § 6-2-17 (1975); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-2-6(b) (Bums 1986);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 614.7 (West 1950); Miss. CODE ANN. § 15-1-65 (1972); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 28-1-112 (1980).
43. ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.220 (1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 21 (Smith-Hurd
1966) (residency requirement stems from judicial interpretation of statute); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 866 (1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 12.260 (1983); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 4.16.290 (1962).
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Montana, Nevada, New York, North Carolina and Utah.'
Subtype B2 contains only Nebraska.45
Analysis of these requirements shows that if the plaintiff is
a resident of the forum state, the forum's statute of limitation
will apply if that state is in Subtypes A3 or BI. The foreign
state's statute of limitation will apply if the forum state is in
Subtypes Al or B2. Finally, a Subtype A2 state will require
further inquiry into the residency of the defendant. Further-
more, the seven states which do not have any residency re-
quirements46 would apply the foreign state's statute. In
summation, if the plantiff is a resident of the forum, sixteen
states will apply the forum statute, eleven states will apply the
foreign statute, and five states will depend on other factors.
III. WISCONSIN's BORROWING STATUTE
A. Classification of Wisconsin's Borrowing Statute
The borrowing statute adopted by the Wisconsin legisla-
ture in 1979 applies the foreign state's statute of limitation to
any action "brought in this state on a foreign cause of ac-
tion." 47 Nothing appears in the statute to define "foreign
cause of action." The only case to deal directly with the inter-
pretation of section 893.07 was Office Supply Co. v. Basic!
Four Corp.48 decided by the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Wisconsin. The court characterized
the legislature's choice of the phrase "foreign cause of action"
as meaning a cause of action which arises outside of
Wisconsin.49
The court's subsequent application of that rule to the facts
of Office Supply is somewhat misleading. Wisconsin's center-
44. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 361 (West 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit 10, § 8121
(1974); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 657-9 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 5-239 (1979); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-516 (1983); MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 600.5861 (West 1986); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 27-2-104 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11.020 (Michie 1986); N.Y.
CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 202 (McKinney 1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-21 (1983); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-12-45 (1977).
45. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-215 (1985).
46. See supra note 39.
47. Wis. STAT. § 893.07 (1983-84).
48. 538 F. Supp. 776 (E.D. Wis. 1982).
49. Id at 782.
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of-gravity approach 50 was used by the district court to deter-
mine where the cause of action arose. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court had adopted the center-of-gravity approach in
1964 as a method for resolving conflict of law issues.5 1 This
approach replaced the earlier lex loci rules which governed
substantive law, but certainly did not affect the application of
lexfori to procedural matters such as pleadings and evidence.
Typically, the question of where a cause of action arose is
answered by determining where the last element of the cause
of action took place. Perhaps justification for the court's
reasoning in Office Supply can be found in the fact that it in-
volved a contract negotiated and signed by the plaintiff in
Wisconsin, called for services to be performed in Wisconsin,
and further provided for performance of express warranty ob-
ligations in Wisconsin, the latter being the major point of con-
tention between the parties. 3 Presumably, the last element
constituting a cause of action for breach of warranty did occur
in Wisconsin.
If the Wisconsin courts adopt the reasoning of the eastern
district, we will be faced with the incongruous result of the
Wisconsin legislature making a choice-of-law determination
through enactment of section 893.07, only to be followed by
the court's independent analysis based on the center-of-gravity
approach to determine if the action falls within the "foreign
cause of action" parameters of the statute. Thus, the court
would be using an approach originally reserved for resolution
of substantive law issues to resolve an issue which, although
admittedly questionable, has always been considered proce-
dural in nature when dealing with a choice of law. 4
The more proper interpretation of "foreign cause of ac-
tion" is to consider where the last element of the cause of ac-
tion occurred. This position has support in the predecessor to
50. The Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted the center-of-gravity approach in Wil-
cox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 635, 133 N.W.2d 408, 417 (1965).
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., Renfroe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 541 F. Supp. 805, 807 (E.D. Mo.), aff'd,
686 F.2d 642 (8th Cir. 1982).
53. Office Supply, 538 F. Supp. at 782.
54. Earlier Wisconsin cases had consistently applied the law of the forum to stat-
utes of limitation. Estate of Schultz, 252 Wis. 126, 30 N.W.2d 714 (1948); Will of Bate,
225 Wis. 564, 275 N.W. 450 (1937).
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the current borrowing statute which was found in section
893.205(1)."5 Section 893.205(1) provided for borrowing a
state's statute of limitations if a person brought an action for
personal injuries which were received in the foreign state.5 6
As injuries are generally the last element of a tort action to
occur, it would appear that the use of the phrase "foreign
cause of action" in the subsequent enactment was meant to
apply to similar situations. Wisconsin has the only borrowing
statute which employs such a phrase; the remaining thirty-five
jurisdictions use phrases such as "cause of action accruing
outside of the state" or "action which has arisen in another
state."
'5 7
Except for the ambiguity of the phrase "foreign cause of
action," the Wisconsin borrowing statute is straightforward.
Once a foreign cause of action is found, it will be barred by the
first statute of limitation to run, be it the forum's statute or the
foreign period of limitation.-8 There are no residency require-
ments for application of the statute, nor are there any excep-
tions. As a result, Wisconsin's statute falls within the
category of those which bar a resident plaintiff's claim
brought within the forum's statutory period but failing to
meet an applicable foreign statute.5 9
B. Effect of Wisconsin's Borrowing Statute
The application of Wisconsin's borrowing statute is clear;
once a foreign cause of action is found to exist, the Wisconsin
courts are required to apply the foreign statute of limitation,
regardless of the existence of any mitigating factors. This is
an appropriate result when faced with a situation which is ob-
viously forum shopping, i.e., an out-of-state plaintiff suing an
out-of-state defendant for an injury which occurred outside of
Wisconsin. The application of a foreign statute is not so com-
pelling when a Wisconsin plaintiff sues a Wisconsin defendant
55. Wis. STAT. § 893.205(1) (repealed 1980).
56. Id. It should be noted that this section also contained an exception to be ap-
plied if the injured party was a resident of Wisconsin at the time of injury. Id.
57. See supra note 33. Some courts have attempted to make a distinction between a
cause of action "accruing" and a cause of action "arising." See Doughty v. Funk, 15
Okla. 643, 649, 84 P. 484, 486 (1906).
58. Wis. STAT. § 893.07 (1983-84). See also supra note 9.
59. For other statutes having the same effect, see supra notes 40 & 44.
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on a cause of action which accrued across the border in an-
other state.
The effect of the statute is thus not only to prevent non-
resident plaintiffs from shopping for a favorable forum but
also to prevent resident plaintiffs from bringing suit in the
state of their residence when a cause of action has accrued
outside the state. This latter effect does not comport with the
purpose of borrowing statutes, the prevention of forum shop-
ping. The unnecessarily broad language of Wisconsin's bor-
rowing statute results in a wide variety of claims which may
be barred despite the fact that no forum shopping was
involved.
C. Criticism of Wisconsin's Borrowing Statute
The Wisconsin legislature could have worded the borrow-
ing statute differently so that only the narrow purpose of such
a statute would have been met without substantial interference
with other rules of law. For example, the Arizona legislature
only borrows the foreign period of limitation if the person mi-
grated to Arizona to recover upon an action which was barred
by the state from which he or she came.60 The most common
wording, however, and one which is equally effective provides
for applying the foreign statute of limitation to any action
which arises outside of the state, "except where the cause of
action originally accrued in favor of a resident of [that]
State. 61
60. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-506 (1982).
61. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-21 (1983). See also CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 361 (West
1982) ("except in favor of one who has been a citizen of this State, and who has held the
cause of action from the time it accrued"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8121 (1974)
(except "[w]here the cause of action originally accrued in favor of a person who at the
time of such accrual was a resident of this State"); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 657-9 (1976)
("except in favor of a domiciled resident thereof, who has held the cause of action from
the time it accrued"); IDAHO CODE § 5-239 (1979) ("except in favor of one who has
been a citizen of this state and who has held the cause of action from the time it ac-
crued"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-516 (1983) ("except in favor of one who is a resident of
this state and who has held the cause of action from the time it accrued"); MICH. COMp.
LAWS ANN. § 600.5861 (West 1986) ("except... where the cause of action accrued in
favor of a resident of this state"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-104 (1985) ("except by a
resident of the state and ... where the cause of action originally accrued in favor of a
resident of the state"); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11.020 (Michie 1986) ("except in favor
of a citizen thereof who has held the cause of action from the time it accrued"); N.Y.
Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 202 (McKinney 1972) ("except . . . where the cause of action
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Both of these wordings have the effect of limiting forum
shopping while retaining the rights of resident plaintiffs to
pursue claims in their home state within the statutory time
period chosen by their own legislators. Currently, the resident
plaintiff's ability to do so depends on the relatively fortuitous
happenstance of where the cause of action arose. Victims of
tortious conduct do not have the opportunity to choose the
location of the tort to any greater degree than they choose the
identity of the tortfeasor.
Although the treatment of resident plaintiffs varies with
the location of the tort, some courts have held that this is not
a violation of the equal protection doctrine.62 It is, however, a
violation of Wisconsin's oft-stated principle that the policy of
Wisconsin tort law is to provide recovery to injured persons.63
Any concern which Wisconsin might have about subjecting
out-of-state defendants to unexpectedly longer statutes of limi-
tation fades into the distance when one considers that defend-
ants do not generally "shop" for plaintiffs; unless a particular
plaintiff is targeted, the tortfeasor is unlikely to know the resi-
dency of the victim and is quite certain not to know the exist-
ence or operation of any borrowing statute which might be
applicable.
In addition to the problems presented by the lack of a resi-
dency exception, the Wisconsin legislature should clarify the
meaning of "foreign cause of action."'  It is possible that the
legislature meant to continue the concept of the earlier section
893.205(1) which based the action on the location of the in-
jury.65 The interpretation of the eastern district of Wisconsin
could also be correct in that the center-of-gravity test should
be applied to determine if another state has more substantial
accrued in favor of a resident of the state"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-45 (1977) ("ex-
cept in favor of one who has been a citizen of this state and who has held the cause of
action from the time it accrued").
62. See Szlinis v. Moulded Fiber Glass Cos., 80 Mich. App. 55, 263 N.W. 2d 282
(1977). Szlinis held that Michigan's borrowing statute did not violate equal protection
despite the fact that it discriminated between resident plaintiffs injured within the state
and those injured outside the state. Id. This case was decided prior to the amendment
of Michigan's borrowing statute in 1978 which created an exception in favor of resident
plaintiffs.
63. Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 481, 157 N.W.2d 579, 585 (1968).
64. See supra notes 46-57 and accompanying text.
65. Wis. STAT. § 893.205(1) (repealed 1980).
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contacts with the action; if so, it is a "foreign cause of ac-
tion."' 66 The first interpretation appears to be the theoretically
correct position. However, the eastern district's interpretation
would perhaps allow the courts more leeway in "choosing" a
statute of limitation than the Wisconsin legislature intended.
IV. SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVES TO THE
CURRENT STATUTE
A. Exception for Resident Plaintiffs
A provision in favor of resident plaintiffs which would
once again exempt them from operation of the borrowing stat-
ute (as section 893.20567 did) would achieve several of the
goals of Wisconsin tort law. First, Wisconsin plaintiffs would
be assured of access to a Wisconsin court if compliance with
Wisconsin's statute of limitation was met. This would be es-
pecially helpful in those situations in which the cause of action
could have arisen in any of several states.6"
Second, the current borrowing statute might actually en-
courage Wisconsin plaintiffs to shop for a forum which does
not have borrowing legislation but can obtain jurisdiction over
the defendant. An appropriate amendment would effectively
stop this forum shopping as Wisconsin plaintiffs would always
be guaranteed Wisconsin's statutory period within which to
bring claims. It will, of course, be impossible to stop any fo-
rum shopping which occurs as a result of Wisconsin's statute
66. Office Supply, 538 F. Supp. 776. See also supra notes 48-54 and accompanying
text.
67. WIS. STAT. § 893.205(1) (repealed 1980).
68. See, e.g., Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 863
(1979). In the three weeks following the introduction of Margaret Housen to "Pony"
Duke, the couple engaged in sexual intercourse in the states of Virginia, New York,
Pennsylvania, Iowa, Nebraska and again in New York. Following this, Duke termi-
nated the relationship and informed Housen that he had gonorrhea and that she proba-
bly had contracted it from him. This was confirmed by laboratory tests which Housen
had done in Washington, D.C. As Housen did not bring suit until nearly four years
after this test, one of Duke's primary defenses was that the statute of limitation had run.
The problem before the court was to determine in which state the cause of action arose.
The majority applied New York law to bar the action. Id. at 337. The concurring opin-
ion applied both the "last element" test and the "significant relationship" test to deter-
mine that the cause of action arose in Washington, D.C. and was likewise barred. Id. at
353-54. The dissent decided that the borrowing statute should be interpreted to require
"the law of all the states where the action might possibly have arisen" to bar the action.
Id. at 354 (emphasis in original).
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of limitation having already run. This can only be handled by
other jurisdictions adopting borrowing statutes, with or with-
out residency exceptions.
Third, Wisconsin could be assured that it is providing
equal treatment to all its citizens who are victims of tortious
conduct. If one Wisconsin resident is injured in a car accident
in Wisconsin, another in Michigan, and yet another in Minne-
sota, an inherent notion of fairness would require that each
victim be given the same amount of time within which to pur-
sue a claim in the Wisconsin courts.
B. Exception for Resident Defendants
Exempting resident defendants from application of the
borrowing statute may not be as favorable as an exemption in
favor of plaintiffs, but a defendant exemption still achieves
certain purposes. The law presumes knowledge of the law by
all persons.6 9 Based on this maxim, potential defendants are
presumed to have a reasonable expectation of the length of
time they must wait before repose for past transgressions will
be granted. A resident of Wisconsin is, therefore, accustomed
to Wisconsin's statute of limitation and would not be unduly
prejudiced by application of that statute, even when the cause
of action is "foreign" in nature.70
C. Exception if Either Plaintiff or Defendant is a Resident
The purpose of "anti-forum shopping" statutes are best
met when the statute contains an exception which applies the
forum's statute of limitation to actions wherein either plaintiff
or defendant is a resident. The most common way of expres-
sing such an exception is by making non-residency of both
parties a requirement for the borrowing statute to apply, i.e.,
"[w]hen the cause of action has arisen in another state...
between non-residents of this state. 71
69. See, e.g., North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276, 283 (1925).
70. This argument is necessarily somewhat circular. If all persons are presumed to
know the law, then that same Wisconsin defendant is presumed to be aware of the
borrowing statutes and the fact that Wisconsin's borrowing statute will allow a shorter
statute to bar an action against the defendant if the action arose in another state.
71. OR. REV. STAT. § 12.260 (1983); see also ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.220 (1983);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.16.290 (1962); accord ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 866
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When two Wisconsin residents are involved in an action
which arose outside of the state and the action is brought in
Wisconsin, there are two possible reasons for the plaintiff to
do so: (1) a desire to have Wisconsin law control the action, or
(2) for the convenience of the parties. Regarding the first rea-
son, naturally Wisconsin's procedural law would apply.72 The
choice of substantive law will depend on "center-of-gravity"
factors with a weak presumption that Wisconsin law will con-
trol.73 Although choosing a Wisconsin forum for this reason
appears to be a type of forum shopping, it is virtually impossi-
ble to distinguish the effect of this choice from a decision by
the plaintiff to bring an action here for the sake of conven-
ience. Furthermore, in a relatively small, unsophisticated
claim, it is much more plausible that the choice to bring suit
in the home state of both plaintiff and defendant was based on
factors unrelated to forum shopping such as convenience and
financial considerations.
There is nothing to gain by requiring resident plaintiffs
and defendants to abide by a foreign statute of limitation when
the forum is chosen for reasons unrelated to forum shopping.
The plaintiff should be entitled to the protection which his or
her legislators have deemed appropriate, and the defendant
should likewise not be able to reap the benefits of another
state's legislature. The defendant, if a resident, has chosen to
live and work according to Wisconsin law with respect to all
other claims. No prejudice will result by holding that same
defendant accountable with respect to foreign claims as well.
To automatically apply the borrowing statute, without excep-
tion, on the basis of where the cause of action arose, is to com-
pletely ignore the particular circumstances and rights of the
parties involved.
(1980) (all parties must have resided in the foreign state at the time that the foreign
statute of limitation barred the action).
72. Zelinger v. State Sand & Gravel Co., 38 Wis. 2d 98, 113, 156 N.W.2d 466, 473
(1968).
73. Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 475, 157 N.W.2d 579, 582 (1968); Wilcox v.
Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 634, 133 N.W.2d 408, 416 (1965).
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V. CONSTITUTIONAL RAMIFICATIONS OF
PROPOSED CHANGES
A. Equal Protection
An equal protection question arises with respect to both
the current borrowing statute and the proposed changes. As
the statute presently stands, resident plaintiffs are divided into
two classes: those whose actions arise within the state and
those whose actions are foreign. Resident defendants are like-
wise divided. If the statute were amended to allow exceptions
for resident plaintiffs and/or defendants, the classes of liti-
gants would be divided into residents and nonresidents.
The Supreme Court of Illinois determined in Miller v.
Lockett 74 that a judicial construction of a borrowing statute
which created an exception in favor of residents is not uncon-
situtional on equal protection grounds.75 Illinois' borrowing
statute does not contain any exceptions on its face;76 however,
the appellate court has recognized an exception in favor of
residents since as early as 1912, a construction which the
Illinois Supreme Court affirmed as late as 1973.78
The Lockett court used a rational basis test to determine
that the state had a legitimate interest in creating an exception
in favor of residents. 79 The purpose of the borrowing statute
74. 98 IIl. 2d 478, 457 N.E.2d 14 (1983).
75. Id.
76. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, para. 21 (Smith-Hurd 1966).
77. Delta Bag Co. v. Frederick Leyland & Co., 173 Ill. App. 38 (1912).
78. Coan v. Cessna Aircraft, 53 IUI. 2d 526, 293 N.E.2d 588 (1973). The reasoning
in Coon was based in part on construction of a related statute which contained tolling
provisions with exceptions in favor of residents. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, para. 19
(Smith-Hurd 1966). This statute was later ruled unconstitutional in part by Haughton
v. Haughton, 76 Ill. 2d 439, 394 N.E.2d 385 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1102 (1980).
The Coon court reasoned that the two sections, the borrowing statute and the tolling
provisions, were in conflict with respect to certain situations. For example, a defendant
who remained absent from the state, thus tolling the statute of limitation, could be
subjected to perpetual liability unless repose was granted under the law of the place
where the cause of action arose. It was for this reason that the court determined that a
resident exception needed to be judicially interpreted into the borrowing statute. Coon,
53 II. 2d at 529, 293 N.E.2d at 590. Subsequent to the Coon decision, the Illinois
Supreme Court also decided that the ruling of partial unconstitutionality of the tolling
provisions did not affect their decision to allow for a residency exception. Lockett, 98
Ill. 2d at , 457 N.E.2d at 16-17; see also Norman v. Kal, 550 F. Supp. 736, 739 (N.D.
Ill. 1982).
79. 98 I11. 2d at _, 457 N.E.2d at 17-18.
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is to deter forum shopping by nonresidents; therefore, borrow-
ing is unnecessary in actions between residents . 0 The Illinois
court found Idaho's decision in Miller v. Stauffer Chemical
Co.8 I to be persuasive authority.8
2
In Stauffer, the Idaho court rationalized that borrowing
statutes are choice of law rules developed by the legislature.83
As with any choice of law decision, various factors concerning
the forum and its relationship to the plaintiff may be consid-
ered; one such factor is the residence of the plaintiff.84 Pro-
vided the decision to except resident plaintiffs from the
operation of the statute serves the purposes of promoting uni-
formity of limitation periods and discouraging forum shop-
ping, the distinction will be allowed to stand.85
In addition to relying on the Stauffer decision, the Lockett
court noted that the party seeking to have the borrowing stat-
ute invalidated was unable to cite any decision which held a
residency exception to be a violation of equal protection.8 6 On
the other hand, a borrowing statute without residency excep-
tions was also held to not violate equal protection despite the
fact that residents injured inside the state were treated differ-
ently than residents injured outside the state.87
B. Privileges and Immunities
In Canadian Northern Railway Co. v. Eggen,88 the United
States Supreme Court upheld a borrowing statute with a
plaintiff residency exception as passing constitutional muster
under the privileges and immunities clause.8 9 Article IV, § 2
of the United States Constitution states that "[t]he citizens of
each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several States." 90
80. Id. at -, 457 N.E.2d at 18.
81. 99 Idaho 299, 581 P.2d 345 (1978).
82. Lockett, 98 Ill. 2d at -, 457 N.E.2d at 18.
83. Stauffer, 99 Idaho at -, 581 P.2d at 349.
84. Id. at/-_, 581 P.2d at 349.
85. Id. at -, 581 P.2d at 350.
86. Lockett, 98 Ill. 2d at -, 457 N.E.2d at 18.
87. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
88. 252 U.S. 553 (1920).
89. Id.
90. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
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The plaintiff, Eggen, was a resident of South Dakota and
sought damages in Minnesota for personal injuries received
while employed by the defendant in Canada.91 There is no
indication in the opinion that the plaintiff had any connection
with the state of Minnesota. The borrowing statute of Minne-
sota barred any action which was barred by the laws of the
place where it arose unless the plaintiff was a resident of Min-
nesota.92 Minnesota's statute of limitation for personal inju-
ries was six years, Canada's was one year, and the plaintiff
brought suit almost two years after the accident. 93
The plaintiff argued that if he were a resident of Minne-
sota, he would have been allowed to pursue his claim. There-
fore, he maintained that the borrowing statute denied him the
privileges accorded to Minnesota residents.94 The Supreme
Court recognized that one of the fundamental privileges of a
citizen is the right to institute and maintain an action in an-
other state's court system.95 The Court stated:
The laws of Minnesota gave to the nonresident respondent
free access to its courts, for the purpose of enforcing any
right which he may have had, for a year-as long a time as
was given him for that purpose by the laws under which he
chose to live and work-and having neglected to avail him-
self of that law, he may not successfully complain because
his expired right to maintain suit elsewhere is not revived for
his benefit by the laws of the state to which he went for the
sole purpose of prosecuting his suit.96
The test is not whether the nonresident has the same pre-
cise extent of rights as the resident, but whether the terms for
bringing suit are reasonable and adequate in themselves.97 If
the length of time to bring suit is reasonably sufficient to allow
ordinarily diligent persons to enforce their rights, it will not be
violative of the privileges and immunities clause.98
91. Eggen, 252 U.S. at 559.
92. Id. at 558 (citing MINN. STAT. § 7709 (1913)).
93. Id. at 559.
94. Id. at 560.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 563.
97. Id. at 562.
98. Id.
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C. Right to Travel
Miller v. Stauffer Chemical Co.99 also confronted an alle-
gation by the plaintiff that the borrowing statute penalized the
exercise of the right to travel. °° The court rather summarily
dismissed this claim, noting that a state action which affects
interstate movement does not necessarily affect the recognized
right to travel. 1 ' Adoption of choice of law rules by the
Idaho legislature was found not to be an inhibition of this
right. 10 2
VI. METHOD OF ADAPTING BORROWING STATUTE
A. Judicial Interpretation
Wisconsin appellate courts have not had an opportunity to
interpret the borrowing statute enacted by the legislature in
1979. Wisconsin could take the same approach as Illinois and
find that the borrowing statute and tolling provisions are in
conflict unless a residency requirement is implied into the bor-
rowing statute.103 Wisconsin's and Illinois' tolling provisions
are essentially the same'14 and would support such an
interpretation.
99. 99 Idaho 299, 581 P.2d 345 (1978).
100. Id. at -, 581 P.2d at 348.
101. Id. at -, 581 P.2d at 348.
102. Id. at -, 581 P.2d at 348.
103. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
104. Wisconsin's tolling provisions provide:
If a person is out of this state when the cause of action accrues against the person
an action may be commenced within the terms of this chapter respectively lim-
ited after the person returns or removes to this state. But the foregoing provision
shall not apply to any case where, at the time the cause of action accrues, neither
the party against nor the party in favor of whom the same accrues is a resident of
this state; and if, after a cause of action accrues, he or she departs from and
resides out of this state the time of absence is not any part of the time limited for
the commencement of an action.
Wis. STAT. § 893.19 (1983-84). Illinois' tolling provisions at the time of the court's
interpretation stated:
If, when the cause of action accrues against a person, he is out of the state, the
action may be commenced within the times herein limited, after his coming into
or return into the state; and if, after the cause of action accrues, he departs from
and resides out of the state, the time of his absence is not part of the time limited
for the commencement of the action. But the foregoing provisions of this section
shall not apply to any case, when, at the time the cause of action accrued or shall
accrue, neither the party against nor in favor of whom the same accrued or shall
accrue, were or are residents of this state.
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The significant problem with this approach is that subse-
quent to Illinois' determination that the statutes were in mate-
rial conflict, part of the tolling provisions were struck down as
unconstitutional.105 Illinois then based its interpretation of
the borrowing statute on the premise that once a statute is
construed and the legislature does nothing to change the
court's interpretation, the interpretation will stand.10 6
B. Legislative Amendment
The legislature alone has the power to change the actual
wording of the statute. In addition to the concern that the
lack of a residency exception is requiring plaintiffs to forego
bringing claims in their home state, there remains the problem
of interpretation of the "foreign cause of action" language. By
using a phrase which is completely different from each of the
other borrowing statutes in use in the United States, it is diffi-
cult to determine if the legislature was referring to something
else or was finding a new way to express an old concept.107
By returning the statute to the concept embodied in sec-
tion 893.205(1), 108 the court can ensure the greatest amount of
protection available to Wisconsin victims of tortious conduct.
Any constitutional concerns which the legislature may have
had previously have been rendered moot by the majority of
decisions finding residency exceptions to be constitutionally
sound as long as they are rationally based to discourage forum
shopping.109
The recommended language is that which applies the stat-
ute only where both parties were nonresidents at the time the
ILL. ANN. STAT. eh. 83, para. 19 (Smith-Hurd 1966).
105. Haughton v. Haughton, 76 Ill. 2d 439, 394 N.E.2d 385 (1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1102 (1980).
106. Miller v. Lockett, 98 Ill. 2d 478, 457 N.E.2d 14, 17 (1983). The court cited
the following cases for the proposition that the interpretation should not be changed:
People ex rel. Boylan v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 72 Il. 2d 387, 381 N.E.2d 276 (1978);
People v. Hairston, 46 Ill. 2d 348, 263 N.E.2d 840 (1970), cert denied, 402 U.S. 972
(1971).
107. See supra notes 46-57 and accompanying text.
108. WIS. STAT. § 893.205(1) (repealed 1980).
109. See, e.g., Miller v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 99 Idaho 299, 581 P.2d 345 (1978);
Lockett, 98 Ill. 2d 478, 457 N.E.2d 14 (1983); Miller v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 99 Idaho
299, 581 P.2d 345 (1978).
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cause of action arose.1 ° In this manner, only those actions
which truly resemble forum shopping would be affected by
foreign statutes of limitation.
VII. CONCLUSION
What effect would a residency exception have in situations
such as those set forth in the introduction? In the first situa-
tion involving an action between Wisconsin residents arising
outside the state, the Wisconsin statute of limitations would
apply, much to the expectations of ordinary citizens.
In the second action involving a Wisconsin plaintiff who
was outside the jurisdiction when the cause of action accrued,
the plaintiff would likewise be able to bring suit timely as ap-
plication of the borrowing statute would not be triggered due
to her residency. If she were actually a resident of New York
at the time the cause of action arose, her ability to bring the
cause of action would rely on the residency of the corporate
defendant. If the defendant had headquarters here and thus
were a resident of Wisconsin,' 1 the plaintiff's claim need only
meet Wisconsin's statute of limitation. This is an appropriate
result since her decision to bring suit here could be as easily
based on convenience and availability of corporate witnesses
as on a desire to shop for forums." 2
If, on the other hand, the defendant were not a resident of
Wisconsin, the law of the place where the cause of action
arose would apply, the presumption being that forum shop-
ping was the only motivation for filing a suit here between
nonresidents. In this situation, there is authority for the prop-
osition that all of the judicial interpretations of the foreign
state concerning the statute of limitation, i.e., discovery rules,
must be borrowed as well." 3
A change in the law is suggested for two fundamental rea-
sons. First, the current borrowing statute does not provide
the amount of protection for Wisconsin residents which con-
110. ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.220 (1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 866
(1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 12.260 (1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.290 (1962).
111. WIs. STAT. § 801.05(1) (1983-84).
112. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
113. Devine v. Rook, 314 S.W.2d 932, 935 (Mo. App. 1958); see also Duke v.
Housen, 589 P.2d 334 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 863 (1979).
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stitutionally may be granted to them. 14 Second, the use of the
phrase "foreign cause of action" is bound to cause interpreta-
tional problems in the future.Y5 A recommended model
which would correct both problems is Oregon's borrowing
statute which requires the cause of action to arise between
nonresidents. 116
The law constantly finds itself in need of change to con-
form to a dynamic society, while at the same time, it is in need
of continuity. The borrowing statute as it currently stands
will only become a liability to the citizens of Wisconsin.
Therefore, amending the statute will benefit Wisconsin citi-
zens and far outweigh any loss in continuity of law.
DONNA MAE ENDRESON
114. See supra notes 74-87 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 47-57 and accompanying text.
116. OR. REv. STAT. § 12.260 (1983).
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